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What is the global constitutional canon?
Its underlying theory certainly must differ, in
significant respects, from that of the
constitutional canon of any individual state -which will necessarily rest to a significant
extent on the peculiar history of the domestic
constitution and on its particular provisions.
For example, certain canonical American
cases like McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v.
Ogden are unlikely to appear in any global
constitutional canon, because a typical 20th
Century constitution –- a category that comprises
by far the great majority of constitutions in the
world today –- is likely to contain very detailed
provisions concerning the legislative power, and
those provisions often grant explicit authority
to handle numerous contemporary problems.

As a

result, extensive discussions of “implied powers”
and broad interpretations of matters that might
“affect commerce” are of considerably lesser
importance in systems in which detailed grants of
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power explicitly cover most areas of modern
regulation.

Similarly, the well-known case in

the German canon that allowed Chancellor Kohl to
dissolve a Parliament in which he actually had a
majority 1, speaks to a particular German problem - extremely important in Germany, but of less
central importance elsewhere.
The global constitutional canon, in
contrast, is more abstract, more detached from
specific history and animated generally by more
theoretical concerns.

It is more closely related

to the basic ideas of constitutionalism and the
general characteristics of liberal democracy
which German constitutional doctrine calls “the
free democratic basic order”.

One important

method of studying comparative constitutional law
-- the prevalent method in the United States I
think –- assumes that there is a certain
universality in these basic principles.

If this

is so, the global constitutional canon might well
be directed in substantial part toward explaining
and illustrating these principles –- and also, of
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course, raising significant questions about their
interpretation and scope.

Thus the cases in the

global constitutional canon should be divorced,
to the extent possible, from unduly parochial
details of the particular constitutional system
in which they arise, and should be directed
toward exploring these broader issues, questions
and problems of comparative constitutionalism.
To illustrate this approach, I have chosen
four cases, each from a different jurisdiction,
which I hope might be considered appropriate
candidates for inclusion in a global
constitutional canon.
I.

Judicial review: Marbury v. Madison
Judicial review -- and, in many instances

quite active judicial review -- is a
characteristic of modern constitutionalism.

Yet

judicial opinions that actually establish
judicial review in a constitutional system are
relatively rare, for an obvious reason -- most
20th Century constitutions (unlike the 18th Century
Constitution of the United States) clearly and
explicitly provide for judicial review by a
3
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Constitutional Court or a Supreme Court, and
perhaps by other courts as well.

Thus, for a

“globally canonical” judicial decision actually
attempting to explain and justify judicial
review, we may have to reccur to the famous
opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall directed
toward achieving that end in the American
constitutional system.

The “globally canonical”

portions of Marbury, would of course not include
Marshall’s fairly cursory consideration of
specific American constitutional provisions at
the end of his opinion, nor would it include his
discussion of a unique provision of the American
Constitution allocating the Supreme Court’s
original and appellate jurisdiction.

In

contrast, however, the global cannon would
include Marshall’s general justification of
judicial review, which is based on Marshall’s
view of the permanent and fundamental nature of a
written constitution, combined with the nature of
courts whose “province and duty” is to “say what
the law is” –- together with Marshall’s
observation that a contrary result would give the
legislation a “practical and real omnipotence”.
4
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The “canonical” Marbury might well also
include passages, appearing earlier in the
opinion, sustaining some general propositions
concerning the relations between the judiciary
and the executive.

These passages could include

Marshall’s argument that, where there is a right,
a decent constitutional system must provide a
remedy –- a proposition probably realized more
fully under section 19 of the German Basic Law
than in the United States –- as well as
Marshall’s twin discussions of the executive’s
amenability to judicial control in some cases and
the countervailing concept of the “political
question”, emphasizing the executive’s
discretion, in other cases.

Even though control

of the executive is often confided to special
“administrative” courts in many other systems,
the general point of the amenability of the
executive to some sort of significant judicial
process is clearly another important aspect of
the “free democratic basic order.”
II.

The Outer Reaches of Judicial Review:

Kesavananda
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In modern constitutionalism, does judicial
review remain entirely within the domestic
constitutional system, or should it extend to
judgments about the constitutional system itself.
One way of approaching this problem is to ask
whether a constitutional court may permissibly
examine and invalidate constitutional amendments
which have followed all of the formal
requirements for changing the constitution, but
which the judiciary believes transgress basic
ideas of constitutionalism.
Some domestic constitutions explicitly impose
limits on the amendment of the constitution –- these
limits may be relatively narrow and the product of a
compromise between contending interests (United States
Art. V) or very broad and focused on fundamental
constitutional principles (Federal Republic of
Germany, Art. 79 (3) GG).

But again, these systems

are perhaps a bit less interesting for a “global
constitutional canon” than a system which, lacking
explicit authority in the text of the constitution,
has sought to create and justify this power out of
whole cloth.
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The “canonical” case in this area is almost
certainly the great case of Kesavananda 2, in which
the Indian Supreme Court found that the term
“constitutional amendment” possessed certain
inherent substantive limitations -- even though
there were no such limits set forth in the text
of the constitution -- and actually enforced
those limits by striking down an amendment of the
constitution.
A comprehensive study of the Kesavananda
case poses formidable challenges.

First, the

opinions of the justices of the Indian Supreme
Court are more than a thousand pages long,
occupying an entire volume of the Indian Reports.
Second, these elaborate opinions sometimes go
rather far afield in exploring intellectual
topics that are sometimes only tangentially
related to the specific problem.
Although the majority justices in
Kesavananda reach their conclusion in somewhat
different ways, the major proposition of this
case is clear: the Indian Constitution –- and

2

1973 Supp. S.C.R. (special volume).
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perhaps by extension all constitutions –- possess
a certain essence, a “fundamental structure”
(determinable by the judiciary) and even a
constitutional amendment that contradicts this
“basic structure” is void.

Indeed such a

fundamental alteration of the constitution cannot
actually be called an “amendment”.
Perhaps fortified by natural law ideas, the
teaching of Kesavananda, therefore, is that the
original fundamental principles of the constitution
cannot be too radically changed, and the judges have
the authority to enforce these propositions.

As one

might well imagine, a doctrine of this sort can lead
to considerable disagreement about what principles
actually constitute the “basic structure” of the
constitution and how these principles should be
interpreted.
Indeed, experience under the more explicit
German constitutional provision (which
nonetheless contains terms of great generality)
show that the same problem is sharply presented
even when the limitations on amendment are
directly stated in the text.
8
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Klass case, for example, the German
Constitutional Court split on the question of
whether a constitutional amendment could only be
declared unconstitutional if it actually moved in
the direction of totalitarianism (the majority
view), or whether any significant curtailment of
fundamental rights should be held void (the view
of three dissenters). 3
The German experience also suggests that it may
sometimes be possible (and perhaps preferable) for a
constitutional court to draw the sting of a dubious
constitutional amendment by interpreting the amendment
very narrowly, rather than actually to confront the
parliamentary super-majorities by declaring the
amendment unconstitutional 4.
III. The Extent of the State’s Power Over the
Individual: Makwanyane
How far does the state’s power extend over
the individual?

Does it extend, in some

instances, to taking the life of the individual?
Some constitutions – for example, the Basic Law
3
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of the Federal Republic of Germany -- explicitly
prohibit the death penalty. 5

(This provision has

-– indirectly -- yielded some interesting cases
finding that the Basic Law also implicitly
prohibits life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.)

Moreover, Protocol 6 to

the European Convention on Human Rights, which
has been adopted by most if not all European
countries, also prohibits the death penalty in
almost all cases.

Yet not all constitutions

prohibit the death penalty, and not all countries
are covered by Protocol 6, and so these other
systems might yield fundamental decisions on the
death penalty that may be appropriate for
inclusion in the global constitutional canon.
Probably the most interesting (and famous)
decision on the death penalty is State v.
Makwanyane 6, one of the earliest decisions handed
down by the new Constitutional Court of South
Africa.

This decision struck down the death

penalty in South Africa even though there was no
specific language in the constitution to achieve
5
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Art. 102 GG.
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
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that end.

In his magisterial opinion in

Makwanyane, the Court’s president Arthur
Chaskalson -- who had been, until shortly before,
the head of a legal services group opposed to the
apartheid regime -- argued that a prohibition of
the death penalty could be drawn from
constitutional guarantees of life, dignity, and
equality.

Working in a new constitutional

system, Chaskalson provided textbook examples of
a constitutional court’s use of materials from
other constitutional systems.

Yet Chaskalson

also made clear that no other constitutional
system could be truly authoritative and that the
decision –- albeit considering ideas and examples
from other courts and constitutions -- must
ultimately be based on the principles of the
domestic constitutional system of South Africa
itself.

Chaskalson also argued, in an

illuminating passage, that the confusions and
complexities of litigation on the death penalty
in the United States counseled against the
adoption of American doctrine in this area.
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As I have suggested elsewhere 7, a plausible
interpretation of the Makwanyane case might hold
that it is, at bottom, a sign of revulsion
against the widespread killing and other
atrocities that had taken place under the
apartheid regime.

One can imagine the South

African framers positing the following
proposition: “In light of the South African past
under the National Party, there has been enough
killing; there will be no more killing, at least
not by the State.

Our Constitution looks towards

life, not toward death.” 8

As this form of

objection to the death penalty might also apply
to constitutions arising after the demise of
other tyranical regimes, this view of Makwanyane
may reinforce its “canonical” status 9.
IV.

7

Free Speech and Private Law: The Lüth case

Quint, The Universal Declaration and South African
Constitutional Law: A Response to Justice Arthur
Chaskalson, 24 Md. J. Int. L. 40 (2009).
8
Id. at 43.
9
A decision striking down the death penalty was also
issued by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in its
early activist period under President Sólyom, and may
also be deserving of consideration for the global
canon.
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A generous portion of any global
constitutional canon will certainly be composed
of cases concerning individual constitutional
rights, and I would like to close this brief
sketch with a discussion of the Lüth case from
Germany 10 -- a “canonical” decision that has much
to say about individual rights, judicial review,
and the application of the constitution in
disputes among individual litigants (the problem
of Drittwirkung, the “third party effect”).
Within the German legal system, the Lüth
case represents an important step in the
“denazification” of German public law after World
War II 11.

More broadly, the case established

three points that are particularly important in
contemporary constitutional law and which should
be represented, in some way, in any global
constitutional canon.

10

7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
For my comments on this point and on other aspects of
Lüth, see Quint, "A Return to Lüth", 16 Roger Williams
University Law Review 73 (2011); Quint, “Free Speech
and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory”, 48
Maryland Law Review 247(l989).
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The first of these points -- very forcefully
made in the Lüth case –- emphasizes the
extraordinary importance of freedom of expression
as one of the most basic of all constitutional
rights.

This point has been at least

sporadically recognized in the English tradition
since the revolution of the 1660s, and such a
proposition was included in the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen at the
beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 -but, as a practical matter, it was more of a
novelty in Germany and certain other European
systems even after World War II (notwithstanding
the inclusion of a guarantees of free expression
in the Weimar Constitution of 1919).
In a famous passage in the Lüth case (citing
both the American Justice Cardozo and the French
Declaration of 1789) the German Constitutional
Court swept away these doubts.

Thereafter, the

freedom of expression was to occupy a very
important role in German constitutional law
(although it did not necessarily always prevail
against other interests in specific litigation).
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As the fundamental importance of freedom of
expression is generally established in global
constitutionalism today, a case forcefully
affirming that point may well be included in the
global canon.
But together with this strong endorsement of
the freedom of expression, the Lüth case also
adopted a technique of judicial review that could
threaten to dilute the force of that
constitutional guarantee.

The Court acknowledged

that cases involving the freedom of speech (and
certain other constitutional rights as well)
invariably involve not only the right itself but
also a countervailing right of another individual
or a countervailing interest (in some instances a
constitutional interest) of the state.

According

to the German Constitutional Court, the
resolution of these contending forces is to be
achieved through a “balancing” of all relevant
interests on the specific facts of each case.
balancing technique of this sort had been
proposed by certain American Supreme Court
justices in the 1950s and 60s as a basic first

15
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amendment technique.

The importance of this

technique, however, waned somewhat thereafter as
the United States Supreme Court adopted a process
of “categorization” -- the adoption of relatively
hard line rules defining certain categories of
unprotected speech -- to cover the most central
first amendment problems.

In a large number of

other systems, however, this balancing technique
represents the major (if not sole) technique of
adjudication for issues of freedom of expression;
and it seems particularly well adapted to many
rights provisions in modern constitutions which
set forth the right in very general terms in a
first section and then qualify that right by a
second section (or a section qualifying rights in
general) that limits the rights of the first
section.
This technique of “ad hoc” balancing -- well
represented in the Lüth case -- has the advantage
of taking all possible interests and
circumstances into account.

But a major

disadvantage of “ad hoc” balancing is its
uncertainty and difficulty of prediction, which
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may seem particularly grave in cases involving
the freedom of expression.
In a third “canonical” aspect, the Lüth case
proposes a resolution to the question of the
extent to which the constitution should apply
between private individuals.

Avoiding the

specific complexities and peculiarities of the
American “state action” doctrine, the Lüth case
adopts a general theory for the application of
the constitution among individuals -- whether the
specific case might involve a court order in a
defamation action (in which there would clearly
be state action under the American doctrine) or
the adjudication of certain contractual
relationships such as relationships between
private employer and employee or private landlord
and tenant (in which there would almost certainly
not be state action under the American doctrine).
Applying the difficult concept of the
“objective ordering of values”, the German
Constitutional Court in the Lüth case finds that
in all cases involving private individuals, the
constitution applies in an “indirect” manner -–
17
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that is, there must in effect be again a
“balancing” of constitutional interests among the
parties, but the Constitutional rights seem to
apply in diluted form.

Yet, even so, in certain

cases the constitution applies between private
individuals in a way that goes far beyond what is
permitted under the American state action
doctrine.
Disputes about the “horizontal” effect of
the constitution have played an important current
role in a number of constitutional systems,
including the constitutional system of South
Africa and the system of the European Convention
on Human Rights.

A global constitutional canon

should include a case that raises and discusses –
- even though it may not settle forever –- this
very important constitutional question.
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